Ἀγαθόν

In general [it is] something beneficial, but in particular what is either identical with or not different from benefit; hence, both virtue itself and what participates in it are called "good" in three ways: as the good (i) from which [being benefited] results, [and (ii) according to which being benefited results,] as [virtuous] action and virtue,¹ and (iii) by whom [being benefited results], as the virtuous person who participates in virtue. Or [they define it ²] in this fashion: the good is the perfection in accordance with nature of a rational being qua rational. And virtue is a thing of this sort, so that virtuous action as well as virtuous people participate [in the good]. Joy, cheerfulness and the like are byproducts [of virtue]. Furthermore, of goods, some are in the soul, others external, and others neither in the soul nor external. The ones in the soul are virtues and actions in accordance with them. The external ones are a virtuous fatherland, a virtuous friend, and their happiness. Those which are neither external nor in the soul are someone's being for himself virtuous and happy. Furthermore, of goods, some are final, others instrumental, and others both final and instrumental. Thus a friend and the benefits added by him are instrumental goods. But confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment, cheerfulness, freedom from distress, and every action in accordance with virtue are final. [Virtues] are instrumental and final: they are instrumental goods insofar as they produce happiness, and final [goods] insofar as they complete it in such a way as to become parts of it; for example a friend and freedom and enjoyment.³ Furthermore, of the goods in the soul, some are conditions, others dispositions, and others neither conditions nor dispositions. Virtues are dispositions, pursuits conditions, and activities neither conditions nor dispositions. In general good children and a good old age are minor goods,⁴ but knowledge is a simple good. And virtues are always present, but joy and taking a stroll for example not always. Every good is profitable, advantageous, binding, useful, serviceable, fine, beneficial, just, and choiceworthy.
The good is that which is aimed at by all things.⁵
Thus the good is that on which all things depend but which itself depends on nothing.⁶