Ἀξίωμα
proposition
Translated by Marcelo Boeri18 Jan 2000Vetting: high13 revisions
Translation
This is what comes into being from a direct or an oblique predicate.1
A proposition is that which is2 true or false or a self-contained matter deniable or affirmable in itself;3 for instance, "it is day", "Dion is walking". Among philosophers the term "proposition" (axioma) has taken its name from "being accepted" (axiousthai) or "being rejected". For the one who says "it is day" seems to be accepting that it is day. Thus when it is day, the proposed proposition becomes true; but when it is not day, it becomes false. Proposition, question and enquiry are different; certainly imperatives, oaths, deprecations, hypotheses, addresses are also [things similar to propositions]. For a proposition is that which, when we say it, we are declaring something, which is either true or false. But a question is a complete matter, as a proposition also is, but one which asks for an answer. For instance, "Is it day?": this is neither true nor false. Thus "it is day" is a proposition but "is it day?" is a question. An enquiry is a matter to which it is impossible to give an answer with a single word. For example, you can say "yes" in the case of a question, but [in the case of an enquiry] you have to say "He lives in this place". The rest of these things [are] evident.
A proposition is that which is2 true or false or a self-contained matter deniable or affirmable in itself;3 for instance, "it is day", "Dion is walking". Among philosophers the term "proposition" (axioma) has taken its name from "being accepted" (axiousthai) or "being rejected". For the one who says "it is day" seems to be accepting that it is day. Thus when it is day, the proposed proposition becomes true; but when it is not day, it becomes false. Proposition, question and enquiry are different; certainly imperatives, oaths, deprecations, hypotheses, addresses are also [things similar to propositions]. For a proposition is that which, when we say it, we are declaring something, which is either true or false. But a question is a complete matter, as a proposition also is, but one which asks for an answer. For instance, "Is it day?": this is neither true nor false. Thus "it is day" is a proposition but "is it day?" is a question. An enquiry is a matter to which it is impossible to give an answer with a single word. For example, you can say "yes" in the case of a question, but [in the case of an enquiry] you have to say "He lives in this place". The rest of these things [are] evident.
Greek original · Adler’s text
Ἀξίωμα· τοῦτο ἐκ κατηγορήματος ὀρθοῦ ἢ πλαγίου ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν. ἀξίωμα δέ ἐστιν τουτέστιν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδὲς ἢ πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ ἢ καταφαντόν· οἷον, ἡμέρα ἐστί· Δίων περιπατεῖ. ὠνόμασται δὲ ἀξίωμα παρὰ φιλοσόφοις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιοῦσθαι ἢ ἀθετεῖσθαι. ὁ γὰρ λέγων, ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἀξιοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι. οὔσης μὲν οὖν ἡμέρας, ἀληθὲς γίνεται τὸ προκείμενον ἀξίωμα· μὴ οὔσης δὲ, ψεῦδος. διαφέρει δὲ ἀξίωμα καὶ ἐρώτημα καὶ πύσμα. ἔστι γὰρ προστακτικόν, ὁρκικὸν, ἀρατικὸν, ὑποθετικὸν, προσαγορευτικόν. ἀξίωμα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, ὃ λέγοντες ἀποφαινόμεθα, ἢ ἀληθὲς ἢ ψευδές. ἐρώτημα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελὲς μὲν, ὡς καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, αἰτητικὸν δὲ ἀποκρίσεως, οἷον, ἆρά γε ἡμέρα ἐστί; τοῦτο δὲ οὔτε ἀληθές ἐστι, οὔτε ψευδές· ὥστε τὸ μὲν, ἡμέρα ἐστὶν, ἀξίωμα· τὸ δὲ, ἆρά γε ἡμέρα; ἐρώτημα. πύσμα δέ ἐστι πρᾶγμα, πρὸς ὃ συμβολικῶς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ναί· ἀλλὰ εἰπεῖν, οἰκεῖ ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ δῆλα.
Betacode
*)aci/wma: tou=to e)k kathgorh/matos o)rqou= h)\ plagi/ou e)/xei th\n ge/nesin. a)ci/wma de/ e)stin toute/stin a)lhqe\s h)\ yeude\s h)\ pra=gma au)totele\s a)pofanto\n o(/son e)f' e(autw=| h)\ katafanto/n: oi(=on, h(me/ra e)sti/: *di/wn peripatei=. w)no/mastai de\ a)ci/wma para\ filoso/fois a)po\ tou= a)ciou=sqai h)\ a)qetei=sqai. o( ga\r le/gwn, h(me/ra e)sti/n, a)ciou=n dokei= to\ h(me/ran ei)=nai. ou)/shs me\n ou)=n h(me/ras, a)lhqe\s gi/netai to\ prokei/menon a)ci/wma: mh\ ou)/shs de\, yeu=dos. diafe/rei de\ a)ci/wma kai\ e)rw/thma kai\ pu/sma. e)/sti ga\r prostaktiko/n, o(rkiko\n, a)ratiko\n, u(poqetiko\n, prosagoreutiko/n. a)ci/wma me\n ga/r e)stin, o(\ le/gontes a)pofaino/meqa, h)\ a)lhqe\s h)\ yeude/s. e)rw/thma de/ e)sti pra=gma au)totele\s me\n, w(s kai\ to\ a)ci/wma, ai)thtiko\n de\ a)pokri/sews, oi(=on, a)=ra/ ge h(me/ra e)sti/; tou=to de\ ou)/te a)lhqe/s e)sti, ou)/te yeude/s: w(/ste to\ me\n, h(me/ra e)sti\n, a)ci/wma: to\ de\, a)=ra/ ge h(me/ra; e)rw/thma. pu/sma de/ e)sti pra=gma, pro\s o(\ sumbolikw=s ou)k e)/stin a)pokri/nesqai, w(s e)pi\ tou= e)rwth/matos, nai/: a)lla\ ei)pei=n, oi)kei= e)n tw=|de tw=| to/pw|. ta\ de\ loipa\ dh=la.
Notes (3)
- cf. alpha 2825, alpha 2826, kappa 1039. The present entry reproduces (with some variations) Diogenes Laertius 7.65-66. Copied to alpha 3628; and cf. also epsilon 3074, pi 3254.↩
- 1This sentence is not intelligible without a brief explanation. According to Diog.Laert. 7.64 (one of our reliable sources for the study of Stoic logic), a predicate (kategorema) is what is said of something, or a thing constructed with (syntakton) some thing or things. Technically, a predicate is an incomplete "sayable" (lekton, on which see Long & Sedley, [1987], vol. 1, 195-202) constructed with a nominative case (orthe ptosis) to yield a proposition (see kappa 1039). Now of predicates some are (i) direct or active (ortha) and others (ii) are reversed or passive (hyptia). This is a way of making reference to the distinction between predicates expressing active and passive verbal forms, respectively. Examples of "direct or "active" predicates" are (someone) "hears", "sees", "speaks"; examples of "reversed" or "passive" predicates are the ones constructed with the passive voice: "I am heard", "I am seen". ↩
- 2Instead of
toute/stin , D.L. haso(/ e)stin , as translated here. ↩- 3(cf. kappa 844.) A proposition is "a complete thing" or rather "state of affairs" (pragma autoteles) insofar as it is a complete sayable, i.e. a sayable having a complete enunciation (see Mates [1961] 16). By contrast, a predicate (such as "writes", "walks", "speaks") is an incomplete sayable, because we need to know "who"? (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 8.70; Diogenes Laertius 7.63). As indicated by Mates (1961) 28, in this context the term pragma has the same denotation as lekton, i.e. it is what is signified when one says something. In other words, the term pragma ("thing", "object", or rather "state of affairs") should not be understood as meaning a physical thing. As a matter of fact, for the Stoics it is an incorporeal (cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adv.Math. 10.218). For a comprehensive discussion of the Stoic axioma see the still useful remarks by Kneale & Kneale (1962) 144-15, and more recently Frede (1994).
References
M. Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a lekton", in S. Everson (ed.) Language. Companions to Ancient Thought 3 (Cambrisge: Cambridge University Press 1994), 109-128.
W. Kneale & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford 1962).
B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley 1961).
A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge 1987), 2. vols.
B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961).
W. Kneale & M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford 1962).
B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley 1961).
A.A. Long, D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge 1987), 2. vols.
B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961).
Linked from4 entries
- α2825Ἀξίωμαpurpose, axiom, reputation[Meaning an] intent. "What is the purpose for which you call?". "Not to reject paternal authority, nor to dishonour the axiom of Plato". That is, intent. "Arkesilaos was very axiomatic, and concise".
- α2826Ἀξίωμαrequest, prayer[Meaning] supplication. David [writes]: "let my prayer come before you, O Lord."
- α2828ἈξιώματαaxiomsThus Aristotle calls both the propositions requiring demonstration and the indemonstrable ones, as [is] his custom.
- α3628Ἀποφαντόνdeniable[sc. Something deniable]; or [sc. something] affirmable. Look under a)ci/wma.
Neighbouring entries
Revision history13 revisions · last 3 Sep 2015
- tweaked translation — Catharine Roth
- added a note — Catharine Roth
- Revised — David Whitehead
- cosmetics — Catharine Roth
- more x-refs — David Whitehead
- tweaks and cosmetics; another x-ref — David Whitehead
- italics, typo — Catharine Roth
- Modified translation; corrected and augmented note; added bibliography — Marcelo Boeri
- added note — David Whitehead
- added note; cosmetics — David Whitehead
- cosmetics — Catharine Roth
- Revised — Scott Carson
- Note [4] is unclear. The phrase "A way to understand it can be..." seems to imply either that what follows may be a way to understand the meaning of the text itself, or that what follows may be a way to understand the real point at issue. — Scott Carson
- Translated — Marcelo Boeri