Καλὸν πρᾶγμα

He[sic] calls [any good 'fine'] which is commensurate with its own utility. [...] The kinds of good [are] four: what is just, what is brave, what is well-ordered, what is scientific;¹ for in such things fine actions can be completed. Analogously [there are] also four kinds of shameful: what is unjust, what is cowardly, what is not well-ordered, what is foolish. It is said that what is fine makes worth praising those people having it, [or]² that the good is worth praising; but in another sense [it signifies] what is naturally good regarding its proper function; and what provides ornament, such as when we say 'only the wise person is good and fine'. But they say that only the fine is good,³ and this is virtue and what partakes in virtue, which precisely is the same as [saying that] every good is fine, and what is fine is equivalent to the good. It seems⁴ that all goods are equal and every good is worth choosing and does not admit either diminution or increase.
Beautiful/fine is what is pleasant through sight or through hearing.⁵