Ἐνέργεια

Activity is more universal than motion, and motion [more universal] than being affected (pa/sxein). For everything that is being affected is also set in motion, and everything that is being set in motion is also active; however, what is being activated is no longer in motion. For an activity is the entire transition from the possession [sc. of certain qualities], but motion is an activity incomplete.¹ For the way coming from what is first in potentiality, toward the possession, is motion (ki/nhsis).
Every coming-to-be and every activity is generated for the sake of some other end; for "to exist" (to\ ei)=nai) is the purpose of coming-to-be and of what is coming to be, and "to have activated" [is the purpose] of both activity and being in activity. Yet this [is] not true in all cases: for happiness exists in the condition of being in activity in accordance with virtue, not in the condition of having already been in activity. So it is necessary to consider whether activity [is] the end of potentiality, or [is] a certain work and deed. Now, those who refer to activity in the cases in which a work is involved make a mistake; for in these cases the deed [is] the end and [it is] better than activity. But we have to posit only activity in the cases where activity [is] simple; for "to have come into being" [is] not a goal of many things, but [the goal is] "to come into being". Certainly, we choose to be delighted rather than to have ceased delight, and to contemplate rather than to have contemplated.²