Ἐπιτίμησις

In Aristotle there are 5 [sc. kinds of 'criticism']. For he says that the same criticisms [are] not [applied] to an argument when it is being examined and when it is being propounded. The first occurs when nothing is concluded, and neither the proposed nor any other [conclusion is drawn] from [the issues] that had been propounded, that is to say, [when the argument] is non-deductive and, what is more, the given premises, on which the conclusion depends, are false or implausible. Of that sort is [the argument] saying: 'what is contrary to what is, is not; what is not, is nothing. Therefore, what is, is one'.¹ In fact, this is not conclusive. It seems that this [argument] does not conclude the proposed, but deductively concludes another thing: for [the correct conclusion would be] 'what is contrary to what is not is nothing'. Another [argument] says: 'if what is liable to generation has a principle, what is not liable to generation has not [a principle]. But, certainly, what is liable to generation has a principle.'² Neither what is proposed nor any other thing is deductively concluded on account of admitting false and implausible [premises]. [Aristotle] lays down a second criticism: if the premises were given deductively, and [if] the argument would conclude something deductively, although not what was proposed but some different thing.³ The third criticism [is the following]: if some additions conclude deductively what is proposed but if what is added is weaker than what is given and what has been propounded, and is less plausible than the conclusion. The fourth criticism [is the following]: if we remove from the argument what the redundant arguments have [the argument] concludes deductively from the rest. He says that there is a fifth criticism: suppose the argument were construed from the most implausible [premises] and less persuasive than the conclusion, or if, [the argument were construed] from [premises which are] true, but more difficult to demonstrate than the problem.