Ἀκριβής

[sc. Something] "accurate" seems to indicate also what is necessary. And suppose we wish to establish [the statement] that every assumption of a serious person [is] accurate. For "accurate" seems to be [the assumption] which occurs through necessary [causes],¹ ones in which every assumption of a serious person participates; for assumptions occur to the serious person even concerning contingent matters. By changing the [term] "accurate" into "clear" or into "true," we shall more easily show what is proposed: for every assumption of the serious person is both clear and articulated, and true. Likewise too, concerning someone proposing a proper assumption concerning something, as about pleasure, the one calling the assumption "accurate" does not yet speak intelligibly; but if he should change "accurate" to "clear," he would make what he says intelligible. It is possible to show that the serious person is inquisitive [philopragmon] by changing "inquisitive" into "curious," for to examine and inquire of celestial matters and the things constituted by nature² is to be curious; and the serious person [is] like that. [Thus we show that] the assumption of the serious person [is] not clear by changing "clear" to "accurate;" for if the "accurate" [should be] necessary, not every assumption of the serious person would be accurate, and so not clear either.³