Διάθεσις

Since the linkage of the soul with the body is not unrelated but is sympathetic [with it], at least some traces of the movements of the soul go to the body, and from the body to the soul. But the form of what is thought is one thing, and the form of what is suffered is another; and regarding the rest, a trace of the soul’s movement is displayed in the body. Hence those who judge someone by his features also recognize the dispositions of his soul out of the shape of his body.¹ It is also obvious that, out of the affective states of the body, something also goes over to the soul,² for [the soul] suffers along with [the body] that is suffering, and [the soul] shares in the pleasure of [the body that] delights. Nobody is unaware that the body, in being disposed in such and such a way, also is a hindrance to the soul. And this would not happen -- the soul being hindered by the body -- if a certain sympathy did not go out of the condition of the body toward the soul. Thus, when the hollow at the back of the brain is injured, the faculty of memory suffers, and [if the brain is injured] otherwise the rational faculty itself [suffers]; and when [the brain] is in a certain state the soul is imaginative, but when [the brain] is in a different state the soul is lacking in imagination. The various properties of souls and the tendencies of the injuries to one consequence or another result from the connection and sympathy [of the soul] with the body. Hence some also have considered that the powers of the soul follow the mixtures of the body.