Ὄντα

Of existing things, some are [taken] to be good, others bad, and others neither [sc. good nor bad].¹ Virtues are good things; the contrary (imprudence, injustice and the rest of these)² are bad things. Neither [good nor bad] are those things which neither benefit nor harm, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation, nobility of birth. The things contrary to these are also neither good nor bad: death, illness, pain, shame, weakness, poverty, bad reputation, low birth, and the like.³ Certainly these things are not good but indifferent, although the former⁴ fall under the species of things preferred. For just as heating peculiarly belongs to what is hot, so too benefiting peculiarly belongs to what is good. But wealth and health do not benefit more than they harm. It follows that they are not good things. What can be used both well and badly is not a good. Wealth and health can be used both well and badly. Therefore, wealth and health are not good things. But pleasure is not a good thing either, for there are shameful pleasures, too, and nothing shameful is a good thing.