Περὶ προλήψεως
on preconception
Translated by Marcelo Boeri5 Nov 1999Vetting: high13 revisions
Translation
[There is] a difference of [= between] truth and habit. For the truth is discovered by making a genuine and complete search. But habituation, whatever is accepted, whether it is true or false, is uncritically confirmed by itself. But the person accepting such a habituation is neither delighted at what is true nor grieved by falsehood. For such a person has not trusted his judgment but his preconception,1 and has bestowed his own expectation on the understanding of what is before him, making use of an unproved chance. And it is impossible easily to get rid of the inherited assumption, even though such assumption appears to him as being extremely distressful and ridiculous.2
Chrysippus holds in the twelfth book of his Physics that there are two bases for judgment: sense-perception, knowledge, and preconception.3 Furthermore, he says that preconception is a natural conception of universals.4
The philosopher Epicurus says5 that preconception is as if it were a grasp, or correct opinion, or a conception that is a universal notion stored in us, i.e. a memory of what often appears to us from the external world. For instance, "such a thing is a man"; for as soon as the word "man" is pronounced its distinguishing feature is immediately conceived of due to preconceptions, since the senses serve as a guidance. Therefore, what primarily falls upon each name is something evident. And we would not have investigated what is an object of investigation if we had not known it first. For example, what is standing in front of me, is it a cow or a horse? For by means of preconception we must have known at some time the shape of horse or cow. We would not have given a name to anything if we had not first learned its distinguishing feature by means of preconception. Consequently, preconceptions are evident. And what is an object of opinion depends upon something prior and evident, by referring to which we ask: "how can we know if this thing is a man?"
They also call the opinion "supposition" [u(po/lhyis ].
Chrysippus holds in the twelfth book of his Physics that there are two bases for judgment: sense-perception, knowledge, and preconception.3 Furthermore, he says that preconception is a natural conception of universals.4
The philosopher Epicurus says5 that preconception is as if it were a grasp, or correct opinion, or a conception that is a universal notion stored in us, i.e. a memory of what often appears to us from the external world. For instance, "such a thing is a man"; for as soon as the word "man" is pronounced its distinguishing feature is immediately conceived of due to preconceptions, since the senses serve as a guidance. Therefore, what primarily falls upon each name is something evident. And we would not have investigated what is an object of investigation if we had not known it first. For example, what is standing in front of me, is it a cow or a horse? For by means of preconception we must have known at some time the shape of horse or cow. We would not have given a name to anything if we had not first learned its distinguishing feature by means of preconception. Consequently, preconceptions are evident. And what is an object of opinion depends upon something prior and evident, by referring to which we ask: "how can we know if this thing is a man?"
They also call the opinion "supposition" [
Greek original · Adler’s text
Περὶ προλήψεως· διαφορά ἐστιν ἀληθείας καὶ συνηθείας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀλήθεια γνησίως ζητουμένη πάντως εὑρίσκεται. τὸ δὲ ἔθος, ὁποῖον ἂν παραληφθείη, εἴτε ἀληθὲς εἴθε ψευδές, ἀκρίτως ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κρατύνεται· καὶ οὔτε ἀληθεῖ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἥδεται ὁ παραλαβὼν οὔτε ψευδεῖ ἄχθεται. οὐ γὰρ κρίσει, ἀλλὰ προλήψει ὁ τοιοῦτος πεπίστευκε, γνώμῃ τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπ' ἀδήλῳ τύχῃ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπιδεδωκὼς ἐλπίδα. καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ῥᾳδίως ἀποδύσασθαι τὴν πάτριον περιβολὴν, κἂν πάνυ αὐτῷ δείκνυται λυπρὰ καὶ καταγέλαστος οὖσα. ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ ιβʹ φυσικῷ λόγῳ δύο φησὶν εἶναι κριτήρια, αἴσθησιν, γνῶσιν καὶ πρόληψιν. ἔστι δὲ πρόληψις ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου. Ἐπίκουρος δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος πρόληψιν λέγει, οἱονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος. οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος, εὐθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται, προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρώτως ἐπιτετευγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό. οἷον τὸ πόρρω ἑστώς, βοῦς ἐστιν ἢ ἵππος; δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοὸς μορφήν. οὐδ' ἂν οὖν ὠνομάσαμέν τι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. Ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ προλήψεις· καὶ τὸ δοξαστὸν ἀπὸ προτέρου τινὸς ἐναργοῦς ἤρτηται· ἐφ' ὃ ἀναφέροντες λέγομεν, οἷον πόθεν ἴσμεν εἰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος. τὴν δὲ δόξαν καὶ ὑπόληψιν λέγουσι.
Betacode
*peri\ prolh/yews: diafora/ e)stin a)lhqei/as kai\ sunhqei/as: h( me\n ga\r a)lh/qeia gnhsi/ws zhtoume/nh pa/ntws eu(ri/sketai. to\ de\ e)/qos, o(poi=on a)\n paralhfqei/h, ei)/te a)lhqe\s ei)/qe yeude/s, a)kri/tws u(f' e(autou= kratu/netai: kai\ ou)/te a)lhqei= o)/nti au)tw=| h(/detai o( paralabw\n ou)/te yeudei= a)/xqetai. ou) ga\r kri/sei, a)lla\ prolh/yei o( toiou=tos pepi/steuke, gnw/mh| tw=n pro\ au)tou= e)p' a)dh/lw| tu/xh| th\n i)di/an e)pidedwkw\s e)lpi/da. kai\ ou)k e)/sti r(a|di/ws a)podu/sasqai th\n pa/trion peribolh\n, ka)\n pa/nu au)tw=| dei/knutai lupra\ kai\ katage/lastos ou)=sa. o( de\ *xru/sippos e)n tw=| ib# fusikw=| lo/gw| du/o fhsi\n ei)=nai krith/ria, ai)/sqhsin, gnw=sin kai\ pro/lhyin. e)/sti de\ pro/lhyis e)/nnoia fusikh\ tw=n kaqo/lou. *)epi/kouros de\ o( filo/sofos pro/lhyin le/gei, oi(onei\ kata/lhyin h)\ do/can o)rqh\n h)\ e)/nnoian h)\ kaqolikh\n no/hsin e)napokeime/nhn, toute/sti mnh/mhn tou= polla/kis e)/cwqen fane/ntos. oi(=on to\ toiou=to/n e)stin a)/nqrwpos: a(/ma ga\r tw=| r(hqh=nai a)/nqrwpos, eu)qu\s kata\ pro/lhyin kai\ o( tu/pos au)tou= noei=tai, prohgoume/nwn tw=n ai)sqh/sewn. panti\ ou)=n o)no/mati to\ prw/tws e)piteteugme/non e)narge/s e)sti: kai\ ou)k a)\n e)zhth/samen to\ zhtou/menon, ei) mh\ pro/teron e)gnw/keimen au)to/. oi(=on to\ po/rrw e(stw/s, bou=s e)stin h)\ i(/ppos; dei= ga\r kata\ pro/lhyin e)gnwke/nai pote\ i(/ppou kai\ boo\s morfh/n. ou)d' a)\n ou)=n w)noma/same/n ti, mh\ pro/teron au)tou= kata\ pro/lhyin to\n tu/pon maqo/ntes. *)enargei=s ou)=n ei)si\n ai( prolh/yeis: kai\ to\ docasto\n a)po\ prote/rou tino\s e)nargou=s h)/rthtai: e)f' o(\ a)nafe/rontes le/gomen, oi(=on po/qen i)/smen ei) tou=to/ e)stin a)/nqrwpos. th\n de\ do/can kai\ u(po/lhyin le/gousi.
Notes (5)
- 1A technical word -- see already pi 2494 -- used by the Stoics and Epicurus (for Epicurean preconception cf. fr. 255 Usener). A preconception is literally a 'grasp' or an 'apprehension' that has been attained before an inquiry. For further discussion see Asmis (1984) 22-24. ↩
- 2This first part of the entry is from George the Monk, Chronicon 98.22-99.9; not recognized by Adler, but discoverable by a TLG search. ↩
- 3Three criteria seem to be offered here rather than two; Diogenes Laertius says that Chrysippus' criteria are
ai)/sqhsis andpro/lhyis . ↩ - 4See Diogenes Laertius 7.54. For the Stoics the commanding part of the soul (hegemonikon) is like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon (cf. Aetius 4.11). However, there are 'inborn preconceptions' which are natural rational components whose function is to determine and to help to interpret the stuff provided by the senses (see Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions, Moralia 1041E). The function of preconception in the Stoic theory of knowledge seems to have been searching for and finding out a new knowledge (see Clement, Miscellanies 6.14 and Olympiodorus, On Plato's Phaedo 125.7). ↩
- 5Diogenes Laertius 10.33. Epicurus' criteria of truth are said to be sense-perceptions (aistheseis), preconceptions (prolepseis) and passions or emotions (pathe). See Diogenes Laertius 10.31, quoting Epicurus' Canon. ↩
References
E. Asmis, Epicurus' Scientific Method, (Ithaca and London, 1984)
G.B. Kerferd, "The Problem of Synkatathesis and Katalepsis in Stoic Doctrine", in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les stoiciens et leur logique (Paris 1978) 251-272
M. Schofield, "Preconception, Argument and God", in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (edd.), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980) 283-308 (especially 291-307)
D.N. Sedley, "Epicurus on Common Sensibles", in P.Huby & G. Neal (edd.), The Criterion of Truth (Liverpool 1989) 123-136
C.C.W. Taylor, "All Perceptions are true", in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (edd.), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980) 105-124
G.B. Kerferd, "The Problem of Synkatathesis and Katalepsis in Stoic Doctrine", in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les stoiciens et leur logique (Paris 1978) 251-272
M. Schofield, "Preconception, Argument and God", in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (edd.), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980) 283-308 (especially 291-307)
D.N. Sedley, "Epicurus on Common Sensibles", in P.Huby & G. Neal (edd.), The Criterion of Truth (Liverpool 1989) 123-136
C.C.W. Taylor, "All Perceptions are true", in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, J. Barnes (edd.), Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980) 105-124
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Revision history13 revisions · last 18 Nov 2021
- paragraph breaks — Catharine Roth
- expanded note 2 — Catharine Roth
- added note for source of first part of entry — Ronald Allen
- a few more tweaks — Catharine Roth
- tweaked translation — Catharine Roth
- more coding — Catharine Roth
- coding — Catharine Roth
- Revised — David Whitehead
- x-ref — David Whitehead
- Revised — Marcelo Boeri
- cosmetics — David Whitehead
- Revised — Scott Carson
- Revised — Scott Carson
- Translated — Marcelo Boeri